

**BOKO HARAM TERRORISM AND NIGERIA'S  
DEVELOPMENT VISION**

**O. B. C. Nwankwo (PhD)\***

**C. M Udochukwu**

**Abstract**

This work investigated the impact of *Boko Haram* Terrorism on the Socio-Economic Development of Nigeria within the time frame of 2007-2012. We hypothesized that *Boko Haram* terrorist escapades have weakened investor confidence and slowed down economic activities in Nigeria. Using qualitative method, we collected and evaluated secondary data to test and validated our hypothesis. Noting that *Boko Haram* terrorism emerged from the political and socio-economic environment of Nigeria, which has not enjoyed the true impact of governance, and that government has poorly responded to the menace, we made recommendations aimed at proffering a suitable solution chief among which are good governance and intelligence gathering. In the later regard, we highlighted the need for government to adopt a strategy of infiltrating the organization.

**Key words:** Boko Haram, terrorism, social system, development, intelligence.

---

\* Department of Political Science, Anambra State University, Igbariam Campus

## Introduction

Since her independence, Nigeria has been bedevilled by one form of violence or the other. Most of the violence has been ethno-religious in nature. With the return to democracy in 1999 incidence has been increasing almost on a geometric progression. The experienced civil war the religious crisis mainly in Northern Nigeria, ethnic and communal violence spread across the nation, and violent activities of group's like Oduduwa Peoples Congress (OPC) Movement for the Actualization of Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) and Niger delta militants are but few examples. Common to all of them is their foundation in the ethno-religious configurations of Nigeria (Oluwane, 2008). Their import to the development challenges faced by Nigeria since independence does not require proof. Yet none ever qualified to wear the toga of terrorism nationally or internationally. They were all understood and explained within the framework of struggle by groups for power and resources until the emergence of *Boko Haram* sect.

On its part and until recently, even *Boko Haram* was a harmless group until they were introduced into violent politics by politicians in their struggle for power. Since its emergence as a terrorist organisation, at least at the domestic level, the security environment of Nigeria has geometrically deteriorated destroying not only the socio-economic infrastructures of Nigeria but human lives, the real propellers of development (Nwosu, 2011). This is happening at a time when Nigerian government is forging ahead to become one among the league of 20 developed economies (Vision 20-2020) and also a permanent member of a to be reformed United Nations Security Council that will make her to be reckoned with politically in the global circle. Giving the role peaceful environment plays in the socio-economic development of any nation, this paper is aimed at ascertaining the relative extent the terrorist activities of the group has impacted the socio-economic as well as political development of Nigeria. In what significant ways has *Boko Haram* terrorist escapades impacted on the development vision of Nigeria?

Without going far, we hypothesize that *Boko Haram* terrorist escapades have weakened investors confidence and slowed down economic activities in Nigeria as to significantly endanger Nigeria's vision 20-2020.

In this paper, we seek to

- trace the origin of *Boko Haram* terrorism
- delineate the incidence of *Boko Haram* terrorism from 2002-2012
- examine Nigeria's socio-economic growth and declines in terms of activities and investments.

- examine any connection between socio-economic indices and incidence of *Boko Haram* terrorism.

We do hope that that this study will aid Nigeria's strategic and economic policy makers to understand the real import of *Boko Haram* terrorist escapades to development and strategic interest of Nigeria. We also hope to proffer implementable policy options for dealing with the threat. The research is essentially qualitative and relies on secondary sources of information.

### Conceptualizing Terrorism and Economic Development

Although of contemporary importance, terrorism has always been and has had wide ranging definitions. A comprehensive definition of the term may therefore not be possible (Lacquer (1977)). However, important to any good definition of terrorism is the embodiment of the psychological element of fear. Terrorism is fear inducing violence. Thus for any form of violence to qualify as terrorism, the element of fear must be part of the arsenal. Most definitions in literature are political in nature with emphasis on violence making it difficult to distinguish terrorism from other criminal acts of violence. For instance, Lodge (1981) sees terrorism as the resort to violence for political ends by unauthorised non-governmental actors in breach of accepted codes of behaviour regarding the expression of dissatisfaction with, dissent from, or opposition to, the pursuit of political goals by the legitimate government authorities of the state whom they regard as unresponsive to the needs of certain groups of people. Thus any violence by unauthorised actor directed against Government is terrorism. The corollary can also be inferred: Government cannot be a terrorist. Yet we know that legitimate government can equally resort to violence for political ends in breach of accepted codes either within or across national boundaries.

According to the United States department of defence terrorism is calculated use of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious or ideological. Key element of the definition is its unlawful character. Lawful violence is directed against combatants and only government has the monopoly of power to perpetrate such violence. Victims of terrorism on the other hand are generally non combatants and the agents are usually non governmental actors. This kind of conceptualization while embodying key variable of fear, removes government and its agents from the list of terror suspects just like Lodge's definition. Both definitions also share

the common characteristic of emphasising the purposive character of terrorism. It is intended to achieve defined goal/s.

Today most of these goals are usually extreme political position or effect. These goals lie beyond the immediate victims of terrorist acts. That is to say, that the direct victims are usually not the 'main targets' of terrorist activities. That is to say again that the addressee (usually well secured) of terrorist act is different from the victim. It commits violence against victims as a means of drawing attention to its cause, demoralizing the populace and possibly bringing them against the main target for failing to protect them. Terrorism therefore achieves objectives, not by its acts, but by responses of the addressee to its acts. It is an indirect strategy. Jenkins (1994) summarized this terrorist's mindset thus: "their actions are calculated to create an atmosphere of fear and alarm to force social or political change....Their violence is not an end in itself, but for advancing a goal. Political terrorists believing they're the vanguard of the people's will, use violence to shock, get publicity, and leverage a government." The strategy include kidnapping, menacing, hostage taking, bombing, hijacking, assassination etc., designed to make people afraid, and its objective is political.

Development is here understood as a pattern of social and structured economic transformations which optimises the economic and societal benefits available to the people within a given political community, in this case Nigeria (cf. Goodland/Ledoc, 1987). According to Nwankwo (2011), it reflects significant changes in the society and the economy in such a way as to optimise the level of the benefits to the people, benefits which are reasonably and equitably distributed. Its ultimate objective is the creation of prosperity and a high standard of living in a community. It is a factor of two variables: economic welfare and qualitative social changes which enables the community to undertake sustained growth. Both are the two sides of development problematic. It is important to emphasise that economic welfare is not the same as economic growth. The primary objective of development is the welfare of the people, "the improvement of life for the entire population of a nation" while economic growth is "its principal performance test". Although both aspects constitute integral part of development, empirical data indicate no rigid link between them. The operative word here is "rigid link" since both are relevant to each other. Economic performance in terms of growth can diverge widely from human development while relative changes in human development observed in Nigeria since the 1960s did not lead automatically to better economic performance. It is however, not part of this

paper to investigate the empirical and logical relationship between them. It suffices for our purpose, to note that both are central to development and vital for its sustainability.

### Theoretical Explanatory Framework

What are the theoretical explanations for the current *Boko Haram* terrorist challenges in Nigeria? Some offer demonological explanation in which the devil is blamed. They claim that the devil make people attack, maim or kill innocent, defenceless citizens. Such explanation does not have a place in the scientific world. Biological explanation according to Olumati (2008, 254), posits that some individuals are more prone to anti-social tendencies than others due to their genetic make-up while psychological explanation claim that anti-social behaviours stem from improper socialization leading to a situation where the individual begins to see abnormal events around him as acceptable social procedures since those in his immediate environment tend to engage in them. We do not think any of these explains the activities of *Boko Haram* satisfactorily. There is also the sociological explanation where individuals become criminals as a result of their exploited by the elite in their struggle for power and influence. Thus even for an ordinary armed robber, there is a godfather behind the scene. This exploitation in which the poor is used and dumped by the 'elite' may partly explain the emergence of *Boko Haram* terrorist group, but not as with theories, the relation between *Boko Haram* terrorism and the development doldrums of Nigeria.

For political explanation we turn to the frustration – aggression theory especially as described in the work of Ted Gurr (1967). The fundamental thrust of this theory is that the occurrence of aggressive behaviour always presupposes the existence of frustration. According Gurr, the potential for collective violence is a function of the extent and intensity of shared discontents among members of society, and a function of the degree to which such shared discontents are blamed on the political system and its agents. This issue of discontent could be social, economic, political or even religious or a combination of them. Insecurity manifests in form of aggression directed against the political system or circumstance which is thought to represent the source of the discontent. When we combine this with sociological explanation of elite exploitation, it might seem that *Boko Haram* insurgency is an aggression against the elite that have used and dumped them and the system they (elite) operate which has not lived up to their expectations.

However, to properly address our research question which focuses on impact, we turn to Talcott Parsons' *Theory of Social System* (1951) and also as further evolved in his *Social System and the Evolution of Action Theory* (1977). In adapting this theory, we retain his logic and replace his variables. Parsons is credited with developing first major theory of society consisting of functionally defined systems. In his perspective, each society, nay Nigeria is a combined activity of its various levels, here better understood as sub-systems. While each of the subsystems is governed by laws of its own and has own special dynamics they are all related to each other so that variations in one aspect has repercussions for others. In historical reality, interaction, communication and mutual enableness between the subsystems is, therefore, crucial not only for each subsystem but for the overall development of the society.

If we inject Parsons System logic into our discourse, we see social, economic, political, cultural, religious, etc. sectors as subsystems of the concrete phenomenon of the Nigerian society. As segments of one reality, they are interrelated so that variation in one aspect, for instance political aspect, has repercussions for others. While each aspect of Nigeria's existential reality has own properties, own rule system and dynamics, yet, (just as Parsons, does not consider his four system levels to be mutually exclusive rather exhibit interdependence), they are all related and in fact interpenetrate each other. The consequence is that what so ever affects one has repercussion/s on the others. This reality is at the background of governments worldwide regulating in one way or the other all subsystems of their society: social, economic, religious, political, cultural, etc. The principle of secularity or freedom of religion is in itself a regulatory instrument in dealing with religious pluralism.

In the logic of Parsons' system theory, we argue that the security challenges orchestrated by a microcosmic fundamentalist group, springing from religious or social beliefs is causing variations not just in the religious subsystem. It has had and is having negative repercussions above all on the social and economic subsystems. If we carry this logic to the platform of the federal system of Nigeria, we can also argue that though the activities of the sect may be localized to the North as being argued before the international community by the Nigerian government, no part of Nigeria is spared its negative repercussions.

### **The Emergence and Ideology of Boko Haram**

*Boko Haram* is an Islamic sect originating and based in the Northeast of Nigeria. The name “Boko Haram” is of Hausa language origin. Its name, which reflects its ideology, translates as “Western education is sacrilege or a ‘sin’”. ([wikipedia.org/wiki/Boko\\_Haram](http://wikipedia.org/wiki/Boko_Haram)). With a disdain for Western education and civilisation, it strongly opposes man made laws and seeks in the alternative the laws of Allah as enshrined in the Sharia code. In fact the goal of its founder Muhammed Yusuf in 2002 was to establish Sharia government in Borno state, one of the federating States of Nigeria. It began as a religious complex where many poor families from across Nigeria and from neighbouring countries enrolled their children. This good intention may have had an ulterior motive of preparing future jihadists majority of who come from neighbouring Chad and Niger Republics.

Significant to note is that most if not all the recruits never had genuine opportunity for mainstream, formal education. One can therefore argue that exclusion from the mainstream education is the foundation of their hatred for western education and all that it represents. As is well known, formal education provides protection by making children less vulnerable to recruitment into criminal gangs. It also helps transform the lives of the young to transform their social status and lift themselves out of the endless poverty cycle that would have recycled them into security challenges. Not unconnected to the two functions above, education helps in building social capital by strengthening connection between schools and communities, bridging ethnic divisions and accelerating development (Steinberg, Rooks and Rock, 2009). In fact every year of formal education, as argued by the authors can reduce the risk of young ones becoming involved in conflict and attendant insecurities by 20%.

In sum *Boko Haram* is a consequence of ignorance, illiteracy, poverty and the misuse of the privileges of Western education by some elites in the North to impoverish their people. However, this impoverishment has been tolerated for almost fifty years of Nigeria’s independence until some thing recently triggered off the reaction. ([www.thenigeriavoice.com/nvnews/79997](http://www.thenigeriavoice.com/nvnews/79997), namely the “use and dump” manipulative tendencies of Nigerian politicians, this time the former governor of Borno State, Senator Ali Modu Sherrif. He is alleged to have armed and mobilized them as thugs to help him win re-election. The sect was promised a lot of spoils perhaps including strict compliance with Islamic dictates in Borno State if the governor is re-elected. Encouraged by the promise, they unleashed mayhem on political opponents of the governor and helped secure second term victory for Sherrif.

Emerging victorious, the governor allegedly abandoned the promise he made to the group while living buoyant life style with those who contributed nothing to his victory. They have been used and abandoned by the educated elite who claim to have gone to school. They were all termed deceivers, thieves, looters and betrayers. Religion became the last line of defence. With the ideological tag of Islamisation of the North which could not be delivered by the “deceivers”, the group gradually spread to other Northern parts of Nigeria beyond Borno (Akukwe 2012). This view tallies with that of the President of Nigeria according to whom *Boko Haram* was a harmless group that started in Borno State at a time they were used by politicians to foster their political interest. Today they have grown cancerous and Nigeria being the body they want to destroy. (Sunday vanguard, January 1, 2012 p. 6).

### ***Boko Haram* and the Terrorist Option**

From the above, *Boko Haram* terrorism emerged ultimately as a fallout of frustration with deceit, corruption and the attendant poverty and unemployment perpetrated by the educated elite. Thus Muhammed Yusuf successfully attracted followers from unemployed youth by speaking against political corruption. Given the vote of no confidence passed on some Northern political leaders with regard to political corruption which in their opinion has its foundation in Western education (Dearn, 2012) the group decided to champion the Islamisation of Northern Nigeria which they believe would restore moral sanity to the Northern soil. In other words, although it has Islamization as its ideology, it also has economic and the political situation especially in Northern Nigeria at its background. However, conscious of the fact that their Islamisation agenda would hit the wall of Nigeria’s constitutional secularism they decided to opt to fight for it using the only weapon of the weak against the strong known to them: terrorism. They saw terrorism as the only fruit yielding strategy. According to Karshima (2012), *Boko Haram* sect, knowing fully well that no negotiating table can guarantee the Islamisation of Northern Nigeria (given the secular status of the constitution), decided to carry out terrorist campaign against the state of Nigeria. The goal of their strategy, like all terrorist escapades, is to induce fear on the concerned authority and through that make it offer/make concessions to their dream.



### **The Nature and Incidence of *Boko Haram* Terrorism**

Terrorism has been described as an asymmetric warfare and a war which no one can predict where the enemy is coming from. It is considered by Nigeria's President Jonathan to be more deadly than the Nigerian civil war (Akhaine 2012). The sect ever since its emergence has unleashed an unprecedented mayhem on the Nigerian state using the strategies of machinegun attacks, incendiary bombing, suicide bombing, kidnapping, throat slashing etc. It gained international attention in what was the July 26 2009 attack in the Datin Tarshi police station, an attack which reported at least 50 persons. On July 30 same year, barely four days apart, the group carried out further attack with gun battles between the sect and the police reportedly throughout Bauchi, Kano, Yobe and Borno states. The worst violence happened in Maiduguri, where the group had relocated from Kannamma base Yobe state often named Afghanistan (Ajani 2012).

The time line of some *Boko Haram* incidence 2003-2012 is to be found in appendix 1. The incidence data is a collation from various news papers and radio reports. The figures on casualties may not be accurate as it differed even from one Newspaper to another. Official report on the casualties as reported by the Nigeria Police shows that between May 2011 and May 2012 alone the sect recorded to its credit 118 attacks of various forms in six northern states of Bauchi, Borno, Kaduna, Nigeria, Yobe and Plateau in which 308 persons were killed (*The Nation*, 16/05/12). A different figure from Wikipedia indicates that the group is responsible for 450 deaths in 2011 and 620 deaths in the first six months of 2012 ([en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boko\\_Haram](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boko_Haram))

### ***Boko Haram* Terrorism and Nigeria's Development Vision**

We hypothesised that the terrorist escapades of *Boko Haram* sect has significantly impinged on the development visions of Nigeria. The focus of this vision is becoming one of the 20 leading economies by the year 2020 (vision 20-2020) and clinching, in the event of a UN reform, the African seat in the Security Council. This two will not only make Nigeria the leader in Africa but also an important political player in the world. Fact is that today, *Boko Haram* escapades are significantly endangering Nigeria's vision. In investigating this hypothesis, we examine the following key variables of the vision: international image, foreign investment, local economic activities, human capital development and national integration.

### International Image

With the truncation of the transition to democracy by General Babangida and consequent ascent to power by General Abacha, Nigeria became an international pariah between 1993 and 1998. The administration of Obasanjo that came on board in 1999 took every possible step to rebuild the battered image. Today again development partners including United States are beginning to perceive Nigeria as terrorist prone state. This perhaps accounted for attempt by some United States lawmakers to get *Boko Haram* sect listed as terrorist group. If this were to be internationally accepted and implemented it certainly will further damage the image of Nigeria. Obifiofor (2011) noted the negative effect this would have for Nigeria's aspiration to become tipped as a possible candidate for the United Nations Security Council permanent seat in the event of reform. As it is well known, domestic and indeed international security credential play pivotal roles in determining who occupies this kind of position among countries of the world. If we are to go by this opinion, one can easily decipher that the nature of security challenges posed by *Boko Haram* is such that may affect Nigeria's chances of becoming a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. Already back Pham (2007) has bluntly stated that "multiracial, democratic South Africa, with its strong infrastructure and vibrant economy, appears, to many, to advance a better claim to the mantle of African leadership than conflict-plagued, corruption-ridden Nigeria.

### Foreign investments

In its editorial of February 19, 2012, *Daily Sun* asserted that *Boko Haram* has practically set Nigeria on fire. It argued that the growing insecurity of lives and properties in Nigeria caused by the *Boko Haram* sect is deterring Foreign Investors from investing in Nigeria. No nation or state would wish to invest in an insecure environment. Government sources on the other hand, perhaps for strategic reasons insist that Nigeria is safe for foreign investors (Jonathan, 2012). According to the President, Nigeria is "one country where investment returns are quite high and where we believe in the rule of law". His Finance Minister Okonjo-Iweala (2012) was even more specific when she argued that terrorist attacks in Nigeria failed to deter foreign investment. According to her Africa's largest oil producer presses ahead with plans to sell Power companies. To buttress the investment good health of Nigeria, Okonjo-Iweala reported the visit to Nigeria by Jeffery Immelt, chief executive officer of General Electric Company. Visiting for the first time,

he reportedly pledged to invest in power, health and failed industries including a locomotive assembly plant. According to her, “investors realized that terrorism is just focused in one part of the country and as long as they feel that we have an approach to deal with it they are, more or less comforted”.

No doubt Nigeria’s oil dependent economy may not be under any serious strain as oil is in the South and *Boko Haram* activities are presently limited to the North. However, as rightly argued by Suleman (2011), the numerous blast orchestrated by the sect do not only drive fear into the minds of Nigerians, they also scare away friends of the country and potential business men. Nwokolo (2012) citing the views of Ezekwesili expressed worry over the growing insecurity of lives and property in Nigeria caused by *Boko Haram* and warned that if the sect was not checked it’s activities could “threaten the nations ability to compete effectively on the global economy”. In the aftermath of the botched rescue of expatriate workers held by the sect (undertaken by Nigerian and the British security forces), Suleman (2011) argued that the event further brought the investing environment of Nigeria under intense strain. In fact, development in nations like Somalia, Iraq, Afghanistan among others, have been brought under intense strain given the impact of terrorism which has eaten deep into the fabric of their societies (Finc, 2008) while the terrorist activities of Alshabab has made Somalia not only a weak state but economically moribund. The steady spiral of Nigeria into terrorism will not treat Nigeria differently.

### Local Economic Activities

On local economic activities, it is on record that that Nigeria loses billions of naira daily to *Boko Haram* escapades. Specifically in the northern parts of the country, the air of uncertainty as to where the sect would strike next has significantly slowed down business. Markets, movement of goods and services, telecommunication, banking sector etc. that are subject to attack by the sect are operating below capacities and at higher costs in the North. We note that more than 50 percent of economic activities in the region happen at night. Today, they don’t happen any more or have been pushed to the lowest. Thus in a month one is looking at grave losses running into billions of Naira. Restrictions of movement at the border towns by security operatives in the fight against the sect have also negatively affected trans-border trade especially in livestock which the North is known for. Obalanye (2012) also argued that the attack of *Boko*

*Haram* especially in Kano is so significant because Kano has always been the commercial centre of most pre-colonial states including present day Niger Republic, Chad and Cameroon. As such when peace is destabilized in Kano, it threatens the foundation of economic and other social well being of all Northerners and even beyond.

There is also this attestation by the Governor of Central Bank of Nigeria Sunusi Lamido Sanusi that the economy of Nigeria is becoming vulnerable to the current disruption caused by terrorist attacks. According him, the current spates of bombings across the country by the terrorist group are threatening the economy and called highlighted the need to urgently develop a framework that will enable Nigeria to effectively respond to any crisis and thus safeguarding lives and properties, ensuring stability and growth in the economic system as only a sound, stable and robust business environment could lead to economic growth, increased per capital income and enhance quality of life” ([www.jangola.com/news/business/1532](http://www.jangola.com/news/business/1532)).

Beside the economic sphere of Nigeria, Ajani (2012) noted that the activities of the *Boko Haram* sect have discouraged the growth of social activities in the country. He based his argument on the decline of religious activities especially of the Christian extraction in Northern Nigeria which he attributed to the numerous blasts the sect has unleashed on Christian churches which resulted in the death of numerous individuals. Such reckless killings he noted further, have not only made most Nigerians lose faith in the security assurances of government, but has also given hoodlums shields of protection in the name of Boko Haram. Above all, it has ripple effect on the economic activities of these Christians.

Okoronye (2007) anchoring his views on the experience of United States of America asserted that as the terrorist event of September 11, 2001 shook the economic foundation of the United States such that she was compelled to declare war on terrorism, so has *Boko Haram* terrorism the potential and capability of unleashing mayhem on the development of Nigeria. While the Government might argue that it is not shaking the foundation of the nation’s economy as it is localized presently, but it is certainly shocking the economy and threatening all sectors of national development. The numerous killings and destruction of available infrastructure continually deplete the growth potentials of Nigeria.

## Human Capital Development

Socio-economic development is driven by human capital. *Boko Haram* terrorism has cost the state of Nigeria human lives which value cannot be estimated in monetary terms. **Almost on daily basis *Boko Haram* strike is recorded somewhere in Nigeria. If market men and women, churches and banks are not the targets, policemen and soldiers at checkpoints are targeted. Today in Nigeria explosives are been thrown around like Christmas cracks. The most mind bogging of the *Boko Haram* attack was January 2012, coordinated attack in the city of Kano leading to the death of close to 250 persons. These attacks can hardly spur development of human capital or development of any sort in Nigeria. (in:[www.Jangola.com/news/business/1532....](http://www.Jangola.com/news/business/1532....))**

The *Human Rights Watch*, the global human rights monitoring group revealed that the killing by dreaded Islamic *Boko Haram* sect is nearing 1000 persons since it launched its initial attack in July 2009. The group noted further that in the first three weeks of 2012 that *Boko Haram* killed more than 253 persons. This, the group argued, has deadly impact as it regards human development in Nigeria ([premiumtiming.com/bass.3553-Boko\\_Haram](http://premiumtiming.com/bass.3553-Boko_Haram)). Lives of scores of fresh graduates doing their national service have been obliterated in a twinkle of an eye. To be assigned to work in the North is to be given a death sentence which many are unwilling to accept. Apart from direct wastage of lives, Ezeaku (2012) also argued that the series of bombing campaign carried out by *Boko Haram* sect is not doing the Northern Nigerian proud as it is worsening the poverty situation of the region. Educational and other activities with human capital development implication are either halted or are slowing down. Schools (primary and secondary), universities and training institutes in the North are either closed down or are near empty for fear of attack. No where is sacred or impenetrable including military barracks! A vicious cycle of poverty security challenges is being created

### **National Integration**

National integration has been a core project of both military and civil regimes that have steered the affairs of the Nigerian state from independence till date. After the experience of the civil war, Nigeria has merely managed to sustain a fragile equilibrium as to guarantee the continued existence of the union (Nwankwo, 2008). *Boko Haram* sect which is demanding the Islamization of Northern Nigeria constitutes quite a daring challenge to the integration of the country. Its constant attack on Christian places of worship has raised so much dust about the union of Nigeria especially from Southern dominated Christian perspective. This explains why

Oladeji (2011) predicted *Boko Haram* issue as a prelude to the Afghanistan situation in Nigeria. According the Nigerian President Jonathan in his new year broadcast of January 1, 2012, the activities of the group have not only threatened Nigeria's collective security but also shaken the foundation of her cooperate existence as a nation ([www.bbc.co.uk/world service/Africa](http://www.bbc.co.uk/world service/Africa)).

As *Boko Haram* attack on Southern Christians became severe a retaliation was carried out in which a crowded mosque in Benin City in the South was attacked and more than 40 persons were injured ([bbc.10.uk.world service Africa](http://bbc.10.uk.world service Africa)). If such retaliatory attacks are given vent in the frequency of *Boko Haram* attacks, then national integration would have reached the precipice. Perhaps the height of the threat to Nigeria's integration was when *Boko Haram* issued a three days ultimatum for all Southerners resident in the North to leave their respective homes in the North or face a death (Obioha, 2012). Despite the safe assurances of the government to the Southerners resident in the North, the threat resulted in relocation of abodes and businesses from North to South an act which weakened the integration project of the country. Indeed, after the civil war (1967 – 1970) in which the Eastern part of the country played the dominant role and the 1993 June 12 crisis in which the Western part of the country was at the centre, the *Boko Haram* development seems to suggest that so many things are wrong with Nigeria's cooperate existence. *Boko Haram* remains an existential threat to the corporate existence of Nigeria as one indissoluble nation (Fabiya, 2012). The integration of Nigeria is becoming Herculean, because it is almost impossible for integration of Nigeria to gain ground when one part of the country wants to run it on the principles and practices of Islam under the aegis of *Boko Haram* (Oguchi, 2009)

### **Government and the Management of *Boko Haram* Terrorism**

In all the socio-economic variables mentioned above, the activities of the sect have had negative effect. Yet the government response to the problem remains less than adequate. Examining the nature and incidence of *Boko Haram* terrorism from the threshold of its foundation, Clinton (2012) asserted that the rampart poverty battering the country is felt most acutely in the Muslim North and is fuelling harm to the Nigerian nation. He therefore urged Nigeria not to cure violence with violence as taking care of the economic well being of the North will go a long way in annihilating the escalating violence. Dearn (2012) agrees that *Boko Haram* terror acts are effects and not a cause and by extension a symptom of decades of failed

government and elite delinquency which finally ripened into social chaos. In agreeing with Clinton, President Jonathan acknowledged that quelling insurgency would have to involve addressing the economic concern including a perception that it has been excluded from oil boom centre in the South ([www.nairaland.com Nigeria/topic-881](http://www.nairaland.com/Nigeria/topic-881)). So far this has remained mere words than action

We concede that the issue of poverty is a factor but there are determined terrorists. Indeed, for even the government to respond to the northern poverty, the condition for such response has to be created. This does not exist. As one does not really negotiate with a determined terrorist, government parallel strategy of protecting citizens through the deployment of security operatives has continued and must be intensified. Apart from deploying security agencies to effected areas, we note that government has taken bolder steps in developing a legal framework in what is known as the Anti-terrorism Act passed in 2010. (Glasser 2011). However, since the signing of the bill into law, government is yet to fully try and convict any terrorist, not even the high profiled sponsors of the group known to government. Government must expedite trial of the many arrested members of Boko Haram. This will send strong signal to intending new members.

In the drive to bring the surge of *Boko Haram* terrorism to full stop, the Federal government on January 1, 2012 declared state of emergency across 15 local government areas of the States of Borno, Plateau, Yobe and Niger (Idonor and Ajani 2012). Suffice to note that this is the first time in the annals of Nigeria that a state of emergency is not only declared at the third tier level of government but without tampering with the position of States' and local Governments' chief executives. This is perhaps to prevent political confusion while giving the deployed security agencies room to combat the surge of Boko Haram. Even with the declaration of state of emergency the sect is still pushing on with its war of terror. This compelled (Sokumbi, 2012) to assert that Nigeria may not win this campaign against *Boko Haram* by force of arm. According to him, it is impossible to protect all churches and buildings at the same time. Besides the suicide bombing carried out by the sect is a clear testimony that the sect is ready to give up their lives for their cause. What the government needs more in battling the sect is intelligence. On this Fabiyi (2012) agrees. Intelligence is a core factor in tackling the menace of Boko Haram. This will involve tracking their sources of fund and other supports and infiltrating the group. Intelligence is critical because terrorism is an asymmetric war in which one can hardly predict

where the enemy is coming from. Nigeria can borrow from the experiences of nations like Israel, Britain, USA, etc. that seem to be winning the war against terrorism in their respective states.

Umunna (2012) noted that Nigeria has not matched its strategic requirement with structural needs. He further noted that in many situation, several unworthy strategy have been tried, some not only within the ambient of the military or paramilitary forces as of instance Israeli and Iraqi concrete walls to separate insurgents from certain areas. We do not think in this direction but deployment of forces to national borders and wide land areas, with the needed requirement to sustain them effectively over a long period. This requires infrastructure which compliments effective security. If this is the reason why President Jonathan is soliciting technological aid from Germany in order to battle terrorism (Obalanye, 2012), then Nigeria is on the right track.

### Conclusion

Whether as cause or effect, there is a clear relationship between *Boko Haram* terrorism and socio-economic nose down in Nigeria. The activities of the sect has brought Nigeria's socio-economic project under intense strain. The series of bomb blasts carried out by the sect have not only reduced a good number of available infrastructures to rubble but has continued to waste human resources which could be said to be the hub of development. The terrorist activities of the sect has continued not only to impede local economic activities but has continued to deter foreign investment in Nigeria. Except the menace is adequately tackled, Nigeria's development vision will end in a blind alley.

To note is the fact that *Boko Haram* terrorism emerged from the political and socio-economic environment of Nigeria, which has not enjoyed the true impact of governance. If the development vision of Nigeria must be enhanced and sustained then government needs to address the poverty level bedevilling especially Northern Nigeria. Thus United States urged Nigeria to tackle Islamic insurgency in the North by initiating jobs and development to the deprived region, while pledging her support in the task (Mshelizza, 2012). Government should at the same time deploy more of intelligence than physical force of arms against insurgents.



## Appendix 1

Selected Incidence of *Boko Haram* Terrorism

Date of Event	Place	Nature of Attack	Number of Casualties
December 2003	Kanama Yobe State	Sporadic shooting at police station and public buildings in the town.	18 police officers dead with several injuries recorded.
September 2004	Geva and Barma Borno State	Attack via sporadic shooting at police stations	Several police men killed and injured
April 2007	Borno State	Sporadic shooting at police Regional Headquarter	11 police officers killed
November 2008	Bauchi	Bomb blast	6 dead and 12 injured
July 2009	Bauchi	<i>Boko Haram</i> stormed Prison and freed 14 inmates of their members	4 people killed
September 2010	Bauchi	Prison attack	Hundreds of prisoners freed including over a hundred of its members
December 2010	Abuja	Bomb blast in Abuja market	28 dead, 10 wounded
December 2010	Jos and Maiduguri	Bomb blast	80 killed others wounded
December 2010	Borno	Machinegun attack	8 killed
May 2011	Several northern States	Bomb blasts	N/A
June 2011	Kano	Machinegun attack	1 dead
June 2011	Zaria and Kaduna	Machinegun attack on churches	16 dead other wounded
July 2011	Abuja	Suicide bomb at police Headquarters	16 dead, 17 wounded
August 2011	Abuja	Suicide bombing of the United Nations building	26 dead, 17 wounded
November 2011	Yobe and Borno States	Series of bomb blasts and machinegun attacks	N/A
December 2011	Mandalla	Suicide bomb blast of St Theresa Catholic Church	27 dead, 40 wounded
January 2012	Kano	Coordinated sporadic shootings in the city	Over 180 dead, many injured

January 2012	Bauchi	series of blasts, including a suicide bombing, and shootings	Over 140 killed
February 2012	Ajaokuta/Kogi	Bomb attack at divisional police station and a bank	Property destroyed
February 2012	Jos	Suicide bombing of a Church	6 killed
March 2012	Jos	Church bombing	3 killed
April 2012	Kaduna	Easter Sunday bomb blast	41 dead, several people wounded
April 2012	Adamawa	Several incidents of gun attacks	5 dead
April 2012	Abuja and Kaduna	Bomblast of This Day Newspaper Corporate Offices	Two dead and six injured
April 2012	Kano	Bomblast in church at Bayero University	20 dead and many injured
April 2012	Jalingo	Attack on a police convoy	11 killed several wounded
May 2012	Taraba	Suicide bombing	11 killed several injured
May 2012	Adamawa	Several attacks on the Police	45 Policemen dead
May 2012	Maiduguri	Machinegun attack	5 dead
May 2012	Kano	Attempted bombing	Attempt foiled
May 2012	Yobe	Machinegun attack	4 killed
June 2012	Maiduguri	Machinegun attack	N/A
June 2012	Yelwa Bauchi	Suicide bombing on a church	20 dead several injured
June 2012	Kano	Machinegun attack	1 dead
June 2012	Bauchi	Suicide Bombing of church	15 killed
June 2012	Maiduguri	Bomb blast	1 dead
June 2012	Maiduguri	Suicide bombing	7 dead
June 2012	Biu Borno	Machinegun attacks	2 dead several injured
June 2012	Biu Borno	Attack on a church	12 dead
June 2012	Jos	Church attack by suicide bomber	4 dead several injured
June 2012	Maiduguri	Machinegun attack	1 dead
June 2012	Damaturu	Machinegun attack	N/A
June 2012	Yobe	Gun battle with the sect	66 dead
June 2012	Kaduna and Zaria	Suicide attacks and Gun Battle on churches	40 dead
June 2012	Kano	Machinegun and bomb attacks	N/A

June 2012	Adamawa	Machinegun and Bomb attacks	Several dead
July 2012	Maiduguri	Suicide bomb attack of Mosque	5 killed
July 2012	Maiduguri	Throat slitting with Knife	7 dead
July 2012	Abuja	Bombing	N/A
July 2012	Plateau/Jos	Machinegun attack	Over a hundred dead
July 2012	Damaturu	Machinegun attack	N/A
July 2012	Borno	Machinegun attack	2 dead
July 2012	Barkin Ladi	Machinegun attack	Over a hundred dead
July 2012	Okene/Kogi	Bomb attack on a church	No casualty
July 2012	Sokoto	Suicide bomber at government office	1 killed
August 2012	Kogi	Church attack	19 dead
August 2012	Potiskum	Foiled suicide attack	Several wounded
August 2012	Maiduguri	Foiled suicide attack at Military Patrol	3 persons killed
September 2012	Several cities	The group attacks mobile phone masts belonging to nine telecommunications companies	Properties destroyed
September 2012	Bauchi	Suicide attack on a church	2 killed
October 2012	Yobe	Three days of ongoing attacks	Over 30 killed
October 2012	Mubi	Machinegun attack	Over 40 persons massacred
October 2012	Potiskum	Gun battle and bomb blasts	Several dead
October 2012	Kaduna	Suicide attack on a church	8 killed, over 100 wounded
November 2012	Kaduna	Suicide attack on a church inside military barrack	11 killed over 30 wounded
December 2012	Kano	Suicide attack on 2 Communication companies	N/A
January 2013	Okene	Attack on Nigerian Army contingent to mali	2 killed
January 2013	Kano	Attack on Emir of Kano	4 killed
January 2013	Kaduna	Gun battle	2 killed

This data is a collation of the authors from several Newspaper, Radio and Television Reports.

N/A = Information of casualties could not be ascertained from the reports

## References

- Ajani, .J. (2012). The Scourge of Boko Haram, Evil they Brought.  
In: *Sunday Vanguard of January 1* pp 15.
- Ajayi, R. (2012). The Black Bloody Christmas in Mandalla.  
In: *Sunday Vanguard Newspaper of January 1* pp. 38.
- Akhaine, .S. (2012). Army Trans Officers on Anti-Terrorism Techniques.  
In: *Guardian Newspaper, May 1* pp. 3.
- Akande, .L. (2012). U.S. may declare *Boko Haram* Terrorist Group over Attack.  
In: *Guardian Newspaper of May 1* pp. 80.
- Akukwe, .O. (2012). Nigerian politicians, Thuggering and *Boko Haram*  
In: [www.thenigerianvoice.com/nvnews/7997](http://www.thenigerianvoice.com/nvnews/7997) Downloaded 4/5/2012.
- Bayemu, .L. (2012), “*Boko Haram* is giving Nigeria bad Image  
.In: [www.cbc.ca/news/Canada/Windsor/story...](http://www.cbc.ca/news/Canada/Windsor/story...) Downloaded on 4/5/2012.
- Clinton, .B. (2012). Nigeria can overcome Security and Economic Challenges  
In: [www.242nigeriannews paperupdate.com/bill.clinton](http://www.242nigeriannews paperupdate.com/bill.clinton) Downloaded 4/4/2012.
- Dearn, .M. (2012). Boko Haram, Nigeria’s terrorist insurgency Evolves.  
In: [www.codewit.com/special.report/special](http://www.codewit.com/special.report/special). Downloaded on 5/5/2012.
- Daily Sun Editorial (2012). Call for National Conference.  
*Daily Sun Newspaper* February 9 pp. 18.
- Ezeaku, .O. (2012). Boko Haram: Looking Beyond the Current Strategy”.  
In: [www.nigerianvillagesquare.com/ossic-ez](http://www.nigerianvillagesquare.com/ossic-ez) Downloaded on 5/5/2012.
- Fabiyi, .M. (2012). Boko Haram: An existential threat to the Nigerian Nation.  
In: [africaheread express.com/blog](http://africaheread express.com/blog) Downloaded on 4/8/2012.
- Finc, .J. (2008). Contrasting secular and religious terrorism.  
In: [www.inforum.org/1826/contrastingsecular.....](http://www.inforum.org/1826/contrastingsecular.....) Downloaded 5/5/2012.
- Goodland, R. And Ledoc G. (1987). Neo-classical Economics and Principles of Sustainable Development” *Ecological Modelling Vol. 38*.
- Gurr, T (1967) *The Conditions of Civil Violence: First Tests of a Causal Model*.  
*Princeton: Center of International Studies, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs,*

- Idonor, D and Ajani (2012). Emergency Rule in Four States.  
In: *Sunday Vanguard Newspaper of January 1 Pp. 1*
- Jenkins, B. M (1994) Interview in *Omni Vol. 17.2*
- Jonathan .G. E (2012). Nigeria, a safe State for Foreign Investment.  
In: *omoghana.com/presidentjonathan*. Downloaded 4/5/2012.
- Karshima, L. (2012). Bombing Nigeria, Bombing ourselves.  
In: [www.gamji.com/article900/news937.htm](http://www.gamji.com/article900/news937.htm). Downloaded on 5/5/2012.
- Lacquer W. (1977). *Terrorism*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson
- Lodge, J (1981). *Terrorism: A Challenge to the State*. Oxford: Martin Robertson
- Mshelizza, I. (2012). U.S. To Nigeria: Develop North to beat Boko Haram .  
In: [www.nairaland.com/Nigeria/topic-887](http://www.nairaland.com/Nigeria/topic-887). Downloaded on 7/5/2012.
- Nwankwo, O.B.C (2008), “Democratic Federalism, and National Development: Re-designing the Nation’s Democratic Institutions for Effective Development”.  
In: *ANSU Arts and Social Science Journal Review*. Vol 1 pp 16-32.
- Nwankwo, O. B. C (2011) “Golden Jubilee of Underdevelopment: Elections Matter for Development“ *Journal of Peace, Gender and Development Studies Vol. 1(3)* pp. 078-090 April. Available online@ <http://www.interestjournals.org/JPGDS>
- Nwokolo, .E. (2011). Boko Haram: Is threat to Nigeria’s Economy .  
In: [www.thenationonline.ng.net/2011/index](http://www.thenationonline.ng.net/2011/index). Downloaded on 11/4/2012.
- Nwosu, .P. (2011). National Security Imperative to Economic Development.  
In: [www.nigeriabestforum.com/generation](http://www.nigeriabestforum.com/generation) Downloaded on 5/5/2012.
- Obalanye, T.J. (2012). *Boko Haramkilling North’s Economy*  
In: *Daily Sun Newspaper of February 9*. p.7.
- Obifiofor, .L. (2011). Should Nigeria be a member of the Security Council?  
In: [www.nigeriavillagesquare.com/iwi-obi...](http://www.nigeriavillagesquare.com/iwi-obi...) downloaded on 4/5/2012.
- .Obiora, .F. (2012), *Boko HaramUltimatum to Southerners*  
In: *Daily Sun Newspaper of January 9 pp. 27*.
- Okonjo-Iweala N (2012) Nigeria, safe for investment ”.  
In: [www.jangola.com/html](http://www.jangola.com/html) Downloaded on 4/5/2012.
- Okoronye, I. (2007). Terrorism and International Human Rights Law.  
In: *IMSU millennium Journal of International Studies*. Vol 1 pp. 322-336.

- Oladeji, .D. (2011). *Boko Haram*threatens Nigeria.  
In: *Tell Magazine of September 9*. Pp. 16.
- Olalegbim, D. Ganiyu .A. and Inna .C. (2011). On the spot visas for investors  
In: *Tell Magazine of September 5* pp. 75.
- Olumati, J. C. (2008) African Traditional Religion and Criminality in the Niger Delta.  
In: Conference Proceedings of International Conference on the Nigerian State,  
[www.readperiodicals.com](http://www.readperiodicals.com) Downloaded May 2012
- Oluwene, O.B. (2008). Federalism and Impediment to National Integration in Nigeria:  
An Appraisal. In: *ANSU Arts and Social Sciences Journal Review*. Vol. 1 pp 32-47.
- Parsons, T (1951). *The Social System*. Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press
- Parsons, T (1977). *Social System and the Evolution of Action Theory*. New York: Free Press
- Pham, J. P. (2007) *Nigeria's Foreign Policy:An Inquiry into Sources and Prospects*  
Presentation Prepared forV FLAD-IPRI International Conference "The E.U. and Africa:  
Looking for Strategic Partnership" 8-9 November 2007 Lisbon, Portugal
- Sokumbi, .W. (2012). The failed Rescue bid. In: *Daily Sun Newspaper of March 14*. p. 19.
- Steinberg, D; Rooks S, Rock, A (2009). Where Peace Begins: The Pivotal Role of Education  
for Lasting Peace" An International Conference organised by Save the Children and the  
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and hosted by the Government of Bosnia-  
Herzegovina. Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, March 11-12
- Umunna, A. (2012). Policing Nigeria: Could Azazi be right.  
In:*Daily Sun Newspaper of February 9*. p 19.
- Wikipedia the encyclopedia (2011); "Origin of Boko Haram".  
In:[en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BokoHaram](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BokoHaram) Downloaded on 4/5/2012.
- [WWW.bbc.10.uk.worldserviceAfrica](http://WWW.bbc.10.uk.worldserviceAfrica)Downloaded 10/05/2012
- [www.premiumtiming.com/bass.3553-BokoHaram](http://www.premiumtiming.com/bass.3553-BokoHaram)
- [www.jangola.com/news/business/1532](http://www.jangola.com/news/business/1532)